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MR. KEYTE:  Bill Kovacic is going to give us 
some closing remarks.   
Everybody knows that Bill is the iconic 
leader in the international antitrust community.  We 
are just so pleased to have him share some thoughts to 
end this 45th Annual Conference. 
PROF. KOVACIC:  Thank you very much, James, 
for the opportunity to tie together a couple of themes 
that have run through the presentations and to talk 
about a number of issues that bear upon the capacity 
of agencies to deliver on the promises that lie behind 
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the formation of competition systems generally. 
My main interest in the field in recent 
years has been on the basic question of policy 
implementation. 
[Slide] There are two critical tasks that we 
have been talking about that agencies face. 
• The first is: What should they do?  The 
basic question about what collection of values should 
be brought to bear on policymaking.  What should the 
substantive standards be?  What is the nature of the 
task that they ought to seek to perform in using their 
resources? 
• The second question is, if you have 
answered the first to yourself:  How to do it?  These 
are closely related in discussions about public 
policy. 
[Slide] Those of you who took a tour through 
a political science course at some point in your 
graduate or undergraduate studies probably came upon 
this book.  This is a classic text in political 
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science.  This is Graham Allison’s book about the 
decision-making process in the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Allison did not so much try to reconstruct 
the basic details of what took place, but he was 
keenly interested in using this case study to examine 
how bureaucracies behave, how they meet challenges, 
how they go about deciding what they will do, and how 
they go about public policy implementation. 
The fundamental assessment that he raised 
was a very gloomy conclusion about public 
administration. 
[Slide] This is the key to it: “If analysts 
and operators are to increase their ability to achieve 
desired policy outcomes, we shall have to find ways of 
thinking harder about the problem of implementation.  
That is the path between the preferred solution and 
the actual performance of government.” 
Allison’s assessment of policymaking in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis extrapolated to other areas of 
decision-making: Is it a key source of discontent that 
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one faces in jurisdiction after jurisdiction?  Is the 
gap between the aspirations of legislation, the 
aspirations of public policy, and the actual capacity 
of agencies to deliver on the promises, explicit and 
implicit, built into that? 
Allison’s basic observation is that if we 
don’t spend as much time thinking about how to deliver 
policy and everything that goes with it as much as we 
think about what to do, we have a formula for failure 
— and, indeed, a continuing source of frustration and 
disappointment on the part of citizens who were told 
“governments will promise in the stratosphere but they 
can’t deliver at the basic level of the surface of the 
planet.” 
[Slide] He raises three questions in this 
inquiry. 
• What is a good process?  A key matter for 
concern throughout the deliberations in this 
conference.  What do we mean when we say “a good 
process?”  What are the elements of it? 
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• How do good projects originate?  Take 
things that have worked, things that have been 
successful; where do they come from?  Clearly, if you 
had some systematic idea about doing that, you would 
do it again and you would replicate that over time.  
But it requires some reflection on what you have done 
in the past, sorting out the good and the bad, and 
understanding how both of them come about. 
• What management methods raise 
possibilities for good outcomes?  That is, if you use 
certain techniques, how do those techniques push you 
over time towards doing a good job?  You’ll not have 
perfect control over that. 
When I was in university, I had a job 
working for newspapers and I talked with luminaries, 
especially athletes who had come to the campus, and I 
would ask them in many instances how it was that they 
focused their own energies on getting better. 
One prominent golfer, still the greatest 
golfer measured by championships achieved over time, 
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said, “I spend lots of time on technique.  I am 
fanatic about the technique.  I realize that good 
technique will not always put the ball where I want.  
The wind comes up and blows it into the ocean.  It 
hits a twig and bounces into the creek.  Things that I 
can’t control will limit my ability to succeed.  But 
good technique increases the likelihood that the ball 
will go where I want.  That I can control, so I focus 
fanatically on good technique as a way of increasing 
the likelihood of success.” 
A competition agency will never have perfect 
success — a perfectly unattainable goal — but by using 
good technique I think the faith we can have in an 
individual system over time increases the likelihood 
that it makes choices that improve economic 
performance and achieve the other goals of the system.  
That in many ways is why we are so deeply concerned 
day-in and day-out about process and decision-making. 
What I have to say about this in the next 
few minutes is joint work with Marianela López-Galdos.  
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These are my views, not the views of the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) where I serve 
as a Non-Executive Director, but I’ve learned a lot 
about how to make these decisions and I would assert 
to you that the  techniques being developed at the CMA 
— and you’ve heard from one of their principal 
creators — are simply the best in class, and lots of 
what I have to say is a reflection of what I have seen 
at work inside the CMA. 
There is still a ways to go to tell whether 
those techniques produce the results that I have in 
mind, but I have a lot of confidence that they do put 
the CMA and would put other organizations in a 
position to improve performance. 
[Slide] To distill them into a handful — 
this comes from work in agencies.  Being in one myself 
where I worked in the engine room and on the bridge 
and in between, but spending lots of times with other 
agencies, I am convinced that an agency that asks 
these seven things puts itself in a better position to 
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do well. 
• For a given project, for a project that’s 
proposed, what do you expect to achieve?   This forces 
you to wrestle with the question of goals that was 
featured so prominently in several discussions. 
I don’t have at this moment a normative 
recommendation for an agency about what those goals 
should be.  I don’t have a formula.  But I do think 
that if you do not contemplate it in a rigorous way at 
the beginning you have an immediate formula for 
failure. 
If you have six goals that you want to 
pursue, then you should lay them all out and you 
should try to identify the exchange rate that you are 
going to use in decision-making to resolve tensions 
among them.   
And yes, you ought to be able to specify 
when you announce your matter to the outside world 
that these are your goals.  No hidden goals.  No 
shrouded goals.  If you meant to do income inequality 
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measures, say so.  If you’re going to use this as a 
mechanism to redistribute wealth and to create better 
possibilities for disadvantaged groups, you should not 
be ashamed to say so.  Those cards should be placed 
face-up on the table.  If someone objects to your 
goals, frameworks, and to your aims, then you can have 
a debate about that.  There’s no shame in selecting a 
broad array of objectives if that is what the 
political leadership in the country expects you to do, 
but you should be able to lay that out. 
If you don’t have a clear idea of what those 
aims are at the beginning, you can point to project 
after project that ended up on the rocks because the 
agency could not clearly define for itself what it 
wanted to accomplish. 
It’s the difference between saying, “I am 
traveling west to San Francisco” as opposed to just 
“go west.”   
How many of you would have confidence on a 
commercial airliner that once you got on said, “We’re 
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just flying today.  We’ll see where we end up.”  That 
would create some measure of unease for you, 
especially if you had hopes of being in Los Angeles as 
opposed to Vancouver. 
• What are the risks?  What are the hazards 
you are going to face?  Realizing that the more 
ambitious the project you pursue the greater the risk 
that it will fail.  Namely, what are the doctrinal 
hurdles you will have to clear; what are the 
analytical hurdles and related data collection 
complexities; and last, to what extent will the 
project put extreme pressure on the capability of your 
people to deliver the job well? 
Going through the risks is not a formula for 
timidity.  But if there are crocodiles in the river 
that you’re about to swim through, it’s good to know 
that in advance.  Wouldn’t you like to know that 
before you started swimming? 
I suppose in terms of being willing to go it 
would be better to be blind to that possibility, but 
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another source of system failure over time is the 
inability to examine carefully what the hazards are 
and realizing that many important and successful 
undertakings by agencies require taking risks. 
For a larger gain an agency properly could 
consider taking more risks, but have that clearly in 
mind as the project is being teed up — what do we 
expect to achieve; what are the hazards we face in 
trying to do it? 
• An underappreciated element of good 
process, and that is who will do the project.  How 
good is the team?  How many good teams do you have? 
I think something that agencies overlook 
over time — I think they have an intuition about it — 
is to focus carefully on how many good people they 
have.  
The numerator for an agency is really good 
people.  The denominator is everybody on staff.  Those 
numbers are different.  No agency has unity between 
them, but not to focus very carefully on how many good 
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teams you have is to start assigning projects to 
people who have no business doing them.   
When we talk about elements of good process, 
I think a crucial element of good process is to build 
a staff that can do the work in terms of numbers and 
in terms of skills. 
A painful experience I see in many 
discussions with different agencies is the mismatch 
between the commitments and the capabilities.  Can you 
push your people to do more than they are now?  Yes. 
To go back to my sports analogies, in tennis 
how do you become a better tennis player?  You play a 
better tennis player.  You don’t play someone who’s 
just as good as you are or worse.  You become a better 
tennis player by playing better people than you are.  
That’s how you push, and you grow. 
But if you play someone who is so 
demonstrably better than you are that you never win a 
point, that’s a bit discouraging.  It also labels you 
as being unwise in your choice of undertakings and 
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sport and labels you as someone who probably shouldn’t 
be on the court in the first place. 
This in many ways is good process.  In my 
mind it means that an agency does not undertake 
projects that dramatically outrun its capacity to 
deliver.  
And it means that a crucial element of good 
agency decision-making is to build that team to the 
point that it can carry out more demanding and more 
difficult projects. 
The problem that many agencies run into, I 
think, is that they assume that their best team will 
do all the hard projects.  But they can’t. 
Now, in my past experience at the FTC I had 
a sense of how many first-rate teams we had.  We had a 
number of first-rate teams that would be the match 
forensically to any opponent.  We did not have an 
infinite number of those.   
We did not post that number outside the 
building saying: “Our two best teams are booked.  This 
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is a good time to take a run at us because the third 
one won’t be able to handle the case.  You’ll have a 
good chance of running circles around them.” 
That is a number that we did not put out.  
But not to know that number is a formula for danger.   
To realize in a cleareyed way about how good your 
people are and whether they’re a match for what 
they’re going to face is essential for an agency, 
without any illusions or gauzy views about how well 
one might be. 
If you realize that you don’t have the 
people you need, that points you in the direction of 
what you have to do to build the institution, which is 
to get better ones; to take the people you have who 
are good and make them great.  If you can bring people 
in that raise their overall skill level, that’s what 
you have to do. 
• What’s it going to cost?  In our budget 
how much are we going to have to spend?   This is 
partly a bigger agency question.  But if you’re going 
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to do three mergers and each of them will cost you $2 
million or more for the external experts, that’s a 
crucial question in deciding what to do. 
We don’t have a good metric in our field 
that helps us predict how much money we are likely to 
have to spend to get a certain result.  We don’t think 
systematically about that so that we can trade off 
this project that will cost me $5 million versus this 
one that might cost me $500,000 and to measure the 
relative results that we get from each.  But to have 
clearly the idea of what it will cost is an essential 
element of going ahead. 
• How long is it going to take, especially 
if the political forces that shape the larger enabling 
environment can change?  Are you bringing a big case 
now that will take five years to deliver and in five 
years the political winds will change dramatically?  
You were cheered for bringing the case on day one; you 
were hated for pursuing it on year five.  How long is 
it going to take to deliver? 
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And by the way, if it’s one of these 
wonderful digital sectors, technologically dynamic, is 
it going to be the same industry by the time you’re 
done?  If not, that pushes us all in the direction of 
thinking more about interim measures — what kind, how 
to deliver.  We have to move more quickly. 
Moving more quickly in itself is not 
necessarily good enough.  I go to my physician and 
say, “My hand hurts.”  If he pulls out a hacksaw and 
says, “I’m going to fix the hand right away, it will 
never hurt again,” I say, “How about a little bit more 
information, a bit more data, X rays, MRIs, other 
treatments?”   
Moving quickly does not always mean moving 
wisely, but we have to think of techniques that allow 
us to do both. 
• How does it fit in the portfolio?  Not to 
look at projects in isolation and say, “How’s this one 
going to work out?” but “Let me look at everything I’m 
doing.  How many fights have I picked?  How many 
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demanding major projects have I undertaken?  How does 
this fit with respect to overall risk and return — 
high risk/high return, medium risk/medium return, low 
risk/low return? 
You can have some imbalance in the 
portfolio, but if you look at your whole program and 
you notice that you have five major projects that are 
“bet your agency” cases each one and you have no 
smaller projects that are building your capability to 
do tough projects, you have a portfolio that is not 
sensibly constructed. 
• Last, how will we know it worked?  How are 
you going to assess outcomes, our success in achieving 
the goals that we laid out before, and to spell out 
what sorts of things we’ll look at as an indication 
that we have accomplished the results that we had in 
mind?   
Asking the last question sets the foundation 
for doing evaluation.  The evaluation doesn’t have to 
be in each instance technically precise, but a simple 
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exercise of laying out expectations, assumptions, and 
matching them to results observed is a relatively 
inexpensive and informative way to do good evaluation 
and assessment. 
I think an agency that takes all seven of 
these things on — and this is an amalgam from what I 
have seen in many good agencies — really reflects in 
many ways what Andrea and his colleagues have done at 
the CMA over the past five years. 
An agency that does these seven things 
thoughtfully with respect to each project is putting 
itself in a better position to get good results.  In 
many respects this is a foundation for what I would 
call good agency process.  
Thanks again, James, for the chance to do 
this. 
The guards are leaving behind the doors.  
They’re putting away their firearms.  You can leave 
when you choose to. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you, Bill. 
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It has been a long couple of couple of days 
or three days for everybody.  Thank you so much for 
your patience. 
I just have a few thank-yous that I wanted 
to give. 
First to Julie Smith and her team.  This is 
Julie’s first year helping with the conference and she 
did an incredible job.  Let’s give her a round of 
applause even though I don’t think she’s here. 
Of course, to our moderators and speakers.  
I think many people have observed that this has really 
been an incredible year for our speakers and our 
panels.  We are so pleased.  And that’s what it really 
takes, is to have the enforcers, practitioners, and 
academics exchanging ideas.  There was lively 
discussion and debate and it made for great programs.  
So, thank you. 
Also, this year we really couldn’t do it 
without the sponsors stepping up a bit more than they 
have had to in the past.  We have twenty-five or 
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twenty-six heads of authority here, which we cover, so 
we needed to do a little more with our sponsors.  They 
were fantastic.   
I want to just highlight that was Skadden 
Arps, my former firm; Freshfields, Kirkland & Ellis, 
The Brattle Group and Compass Lexecon doing the 
economic workshops; Davis Polk, European Economic and 
Marketing Consultants, Allen & Overy, Linklaters, 
Rucellai & Raffaelli, Bates White, and Mayer Brown.  
Without them we really couldn’t have this program.  So 
that is fantastic. 
Of course, thank all of you for coming and 
participating with questions. 
Our keynote speakers.  Again, that is the 
foundation.  People want to come and hear the 
agencies, what they have to say.  It’s fantastic to 
have a Q&A session.  Maureen and others, thank you for 
that. 
Finally, next year it will be in mid-
September.  I think it’s going to be the 11th to the 
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13th or after.  I think that should be very helpful for 
everybody. 
Again, thank you very much.  Enjoy the rest 
of the day.  Get some actual food.  Safe travels to 
wherever you’re headed. 
Thank you. 
[Adjourned: 1:55 p.m.] 
